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The Bare Metaphysical Possibility of 
Bare Dispositions 
JENNIFER MCKITRICK 
University of Alabama at Birmingham 
Many philosophers hold that all dispositions must have independent causal bases. I 
challenge this view, hence defending the possibility of bare dispositions. In part 1, I 
explain more fully what I mean by "disposition," "causal basis," and "bare disposition." 
In part 2, I consider the claim that the concept of a disposition entails that dispositions 
are not bare. In part 3, I consider arguments, due to Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson, that 
dispositions necessarily have distinct causal bases. In part 4, I consider arguments by 
Smith and Stoljar that there can't be bare dispositions because they would make for 
unwelcome 
"barely true" counterfactuals. In the end, I find no reason to deny the 
possibility of bare dispositions. 
It is asked what the cause and reason are of opium's making one sleep. 
To which I respond: because there is in it a dormitive virtue whose 
nature it is to put the senses to sleep. 
Moliere, "Le Malade Imaginaire" 
1. Introduction 
As Moliere's jest illustrates, if someone is wondering why taking opium 
puts one to sleep, telling him that it has a disposition to do so is not very 
helpful. More ought to be said about why opium causes sleep, and in fact, we 
can say more: opium contains alkaloids such as morphine which, being struc 
turally similar to the body's naturally occurring peptides, bind to opiate 
receptors in the brain, causing sleep. Some people think that all dispositions 
are like the dormitivity of opium, in that there must always be another prop 
erty that causally explains the manifestation of the disposition. When people 
ask why something produces a certain effect, they are often looking for a 
deeper explanation than just "because it is disposed to produce that effect." 
The inability to produce a deeper explanation, on this view, reflects ignorance 
or a failure of understanding.1 It is supposed that there must be something 
other than the disposition that causally explains the manifestation, or to use 
1 
"We thus expose ourselves to Moliere's ridicule, and, if we did nothing further, we 
would deserve it." D. M. Armstrong, Belief, Truth and Knowledge (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1973), 15. 
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terminology that is now common, every disposition must have a distinct 
"causal basis." There is something puzzling about the idea of a bare disposi 
tion?a disposition that has no distinct causal basis. Some have argued that 
the very idea of a bare disposition is incoherent. However, I disagree. Bare 
dispositions are possible. Moreover, it is an open question whether any 
objects have bare dispositions in this world. 
Significantly, bare dispositions figure in larger metaphysical programs, 
for example, the phenomenalist view that matter is the "permanent possibil 
ity of sensation."2 More recently, some philosophers have defended the view 
that the fundamental properties of the ultimate constituents of matter are dis 
positional.3 On these views, the world abounds with bare dispositions. On 
some other views, there are no bare dispositions. For example, according to 
Lewis' "Humean supervenience," everything that is true about the world 
supervenes on "a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact."4 I take it 
that, on this view, these local matters of particular fact are not dispositional. 
It follows that, if the world contains bare dispositions, Humean superven 
ience is false. Clearly, a defense of bare dispositions has broad philosophical 
significance. 
My defense will proceed as follows. In part 1,1 explain more fully what I 
mean by "disposition," "causal basis," and "bare disposition." In part 2, I 
consider the claim that the concept of a disposition entails that dispositions 
are not bare. In part 3,1 consider arguments, due to Prior, Pargetter, and Jack 
son, that dispositions necessarily have distinct causal bases.5 In part 4, I con 
sider arguments by Smith and Stoljar that there can't be bare dispositions 
because they would make for unwelcome "barely true" counterfactuals.6 In the 
end, I find no reason to deny the possibility of bare dispositions. 
1.1 Dispositional versus Categorical 
The paradigm examples of dispositions, as I am using the term, are properties 
of physical objects: fragility, inflammability, elasticity, conductivity, solu 
bility, volatility, dormitivity, and poisonousness, for example. These proper 
John Stuart Mill, Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume IX: An Examination of Sir 
William Hamilton's Philosophy and of The Principal Philosophical Questions Discussed in 
his Writings, ed. J. M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), 183. 3 
For example, Simon Blackburn, "Filling in Space," Analysis 50 (1990), 60-65; P. F. Straw 
son, "Reply to Evans" in Zak van Straaten, ed., Philosophical Subjects (Oxford: Claren 
don Press, 1980), 273-282; Richard Holton, "Dispositions All the Way Around," Analysis 
59(1999), 9-14. 
David Lewis, Philosophical Papers, vol. II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 
ix. 
5 
Elizabeth W. Prior, Robert Pargetter, and Frank Jackson, "Three Theses About Disposi 
tions," American Philosophical Quarterly, 19 (1982), 251-257. 
Michael Smith and Daniel Stoljar, "Global Response Dependence and Noumenal Real 
ism," Monist, 81 (1998), 85-111. 
350 JENNIFER MCKITRICK 
ties are associated with an event-type involving the object that has the dispo 
sition. This event-type is the manifestation of the disposition?shattering, 
burning, stretching, conducting, dissolving, evaporating, putting to sleep, 
poisoning and so on. An object can have a disposition prior to the occurrence 
of the manifestation. In fact, an object can have a disposition even if the 
manifestation of that disposition never occurs. A glass can remain fragile 
even if it never shatters, fuel can be inflammable even if it never burns, and 
so on. In addition to its manifestation, a disposition is associated with 
another event-type, the circumstances of manifestation. In the case of fragil 
ity, the circumstances of manifestation typically involve a striking of the 
fragile object. In the case of solubility, the circumstances of manifestation 
involve the submersion of the soluble object in a solvent. 
An attribution of a disposition to an object licenses inferences about what 
will happen in various circumstances. According to Elizabeth Prior, "What is 
commonly accepted by all those who discuss dispositions is that there exists 
a conceptual connection between a statement attributing a disposition to an 
item and a particular conditional."7 To say that disposition statements entail 
counterfactual s is perhaps too strong,8 but we can admit this much: if you 
know that something has a certain disposition, and that it will be subject to 
the circumstances of manifestation, you have some basis for predicting its 
behavior. For example, if you know that a sugar cube is water-soluble, and 
that it is about to be placed in a beaker of water at room temperature, you 
have good grounds for predicting that it will dissolve. 
A categorical property, by contrast, need not be associated with a trigger 
ing event or a manifestation.9 As paradigm examples of categorical proper 
ties, philosophers often offer shape properties. To say something is square is 
not to say anything about what it would do in particular circumstances; 
squareness has no associated manifestation or triggering event.10 According to 
7 
Elizabeth Prior, Dispositions (New Jersey: Aberdeen University Press, 1985), 5. 8 C. B. Martin, "Dispositions and Conditionals" (American Philosophical Quarterly, 1994) 
among others, show that disposition statements do not entail certain simple counterfactu 
als. For example, if a fragile glass is protected by internal supports, "the glass is fragile" 
is true, but the counterfactual "If the glass were struck it would break" is false. 
For present purposes, we need not suppose that this distinction among properties is 
exhaustive. For example, mathematical properties and some disjunctive properties (frag 
ile or square) might be neither categorical nor dispositional. 10 
Hugh Mellor argues that even shape properties are dispositions. For example, he says that 
triangularity is the property of being disposed to be counted as three-angled ("In Defense 
of Dispositions," Philosophical Review, 83 (1974), 171). Similarly, Goodman says "a 
cubical object is one capable of fitting try squares and measuring instruments in certain 
ways. Indeed, almost every predicate commonly thought of as describing a lasting objec 
tive characteristic of a thing is as much a dispositional predicate as any other" (Fact, 
Fiction, and Forecast, 4th ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 41). I 
am not going to discuss these claims here; I am just trying to explain the distinction 
between dispositional and categorical properties, without taking a stand as to which (if 
any) specific properties fall into each category. Nothing I say hangs on the correct way 
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a common view, categorical properties lack the special relation to counterfac 
tuals had by dispositions. Prior says, "dispositional properties can be distin 
guished from categorical ones because dispositional ascription sentences 
possess a relationship to certain subjunctive conditionals not possessed by 
categorical ascription sentences."11 Along these lines, Stephen Yablo offers 
as an intuitive characterization, "a property is categorical just in case a 
thing's having it is independent of what goes on in nonactual worlds."12 
I'm assuming that the dispositional/categorical distinction applies to 
properties, but some philosophers dispute this claim. Armstrong and Shoe 
maker, for example, both say that the distinction applies merely to predicates. 
Shoemaker says that what determines the identity of a property "is its poten 
tial for contributing to the causal powers of the things that have it."13 One 
might want to describe his view by saying that all properties are disposi 
tional, but Shoemaker resists this move. He says "I think that the term 
'dispositional' is best employed as a predicate of predicates, not of proper 
ties."14 Similarly, Armstrong claims that the dispositional/categorical 
distinction is a "verbal distinction that cuts no ontological ice."15 Unlike 
Shoemaker, however, Armstrong thinks that all properties are categorical.16 
He acknowledges that some states of objects are picked out by disposition 
terms, but claims that such terms simply provide us with a useful way of 
speaking of categorical properties. 
Clearly, Armstrong thinks that the distinction between properties is 
coherent?he just thinks that one of the categories is empty, and so if a non 
trivial distinction is wanted, then it must apply to predicates. And although 
Shoemaker wants to reserve 
'being dispositional' as a predicate of predicates, 
he can agree with Armstrong that the distinction between properties makes 
sense?he just disagrees about which category is empty. These views differ 
from the extreme thesis that the distinction between dispositional properties 
and categorical properties is unintelligible, or that a purely linguistic distinc 
tion is being confused with a distinction between entities. For example, some 
property terms such as 'yellow' are polysyllabic, while others such as 'red' 
are monosyllabic. It would be a mistake to conclude that, because of this 
linguistic fact, there is an interesting metaphysical distinction between the 
properties to which these terms refer. There is widespread agreement, at least, 
to characterize categorical properties, for my arguments here would be consistent with 
there being no categorical properties. 
Dispositions, 62. 12 
Stephen Yablo, "Identity, Essence, and Indiscernibility," The Journal of Philosophy 84:6 
(June 1987), 306. Yablo goes on to argue that this characterization is inadequate. 13 
Sydney Shoemaker, "Causality and Properties," in Peter van Inwagen, ed., Time and 
Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1980), 109-136. 14 
Ibid.,2\\. 
Belief, Truth and Knowledge, 15. 16 
Tim Crane, ed., Dispositions: A Debate (New York: Routledge, 1996), 16. 
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that the dispositional/categorical distinction is not like that. Consequently, 
my arguments proceed on the assumption that the issues are metaphysical, 
not merely linguistic.17 
1.2 Causal Bases 
When a sleeping pill puts someone to sleep, that event can be causally 
explained in terms of the chemical properties of the pill. When a fragile glass 
breaks, that event can be causally explained in terms of the microstructural 
properties of the glass. These chemical and microstructural properties are 
causally relevant to the associated manifestations.18 A property of a disposed 
object which can causally explain the manifestation of the disposition is 
called a causal basis of that disposition. A causal basis is a property of an 
object which is causally relevant to the manifestation of the disposition. 
So, a causal basis is a causally relevant property, but what kind of prop 
erty? There are three candidates. Either causal bases are always categorical, 
always dispositional, or they can be either categorical or dispositional.19 A 
causal basis for fragility might be a particular type of molecular bonding. 
Plausibly, to have a particular type of molecular bonding is to have a disposi 
tional property. As Armstrong says, "To talk of molecular bonding is surely 
to talk again in terms of dispositions of bonded things."20 If a type of 
molecular bonding can serve as the basis of fragility, say, then there can be 
causal bases of dispositions that are themselves dispositions. I use the 
expression "causal basis" as neutral between dispositional bases and categori 
cal bases, unless stated otherwise. 
Note that a causal basis is not, conceptually or by definition, distinct from 
its associated disposition: if fragility turns out to be causally relevant to 
breaking, then fragility is its own causal basis. This will become important 
in the arguments that follow. One might balk at the idea of a causally rele 
Similarly, it might be said that the distinction between bare and non-bare dispositions 
applies only to predicates. One may claim that among the dispositional predicates, we can 
distinguish the bare-dispositional predicates, which imply no distinct causal basis, and the 
non-bare-dispositional predicates, which do imply a distinct causal basis. However, the 
prospect of locating the bare/non-bare distinction in our language does not look promis 
ing. Furthermore, all parties to the debate under consideration treat the bare/non-bare 
distinction as metaphysical, so I will set this possibility aside. 18 
What is it for a property to be causally relevant? Intuitively, some properties exemplified 
in an event are relevant to what that event causes, and others are not. If a baseball is 
thrown at a window, the mass and velocity of the ball seem relevant to the window's 
breaking, while the color of the ball seems irrelevant. I use expressions 
" 
...is causally 
relevant to..." and 
"...causally explains..." interchangeably. For the purposes of this 
paper, I do not distinguish between "causal relevance" and "causal efficacy," as Frank 
Jackson does ("Mental Properties, Essentialism and Causation," Proceedings of the Aris 
totelian Society, 95, 253-268). 
Although I am not assuming the dispositional/categorical distinction to be exhaustive, 
given the classes of properties under consideration, these are the three salient candidates. 20 
Belief Truth and Knowledge, 13. 
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vant disposition; however, anyone who claims that dispositions can have 
dispositional causal bases is supposing that dispositions can be causally rele 
vant. If a disposition can be the causal basis of a disposition, what is to pre 
clude a disposition from being a causal basis of itself? 
It might seem counter-intuitive to say that a disposition can be its own 
causal basis. However, I think this sense of counter-intuitiveness results from 
confusions that can be dispelled by getting clear on how these expressions are 
employed. To say that a disposition can be its own causal basis is not to say 
that a disposition causally explains itself, but only that it causally explains 
its manifestation. Furthermore, when one says "a disposition has a causal 
basis," this does not, by itself, suggest that the disposition and the causal 
basis are distinct. A disposition and a causal basis are both properties instan 
tiated by objects. It is the object with the disposition that has the causal 
basis, in the property-instantiation sense. To say that a disposition has a 
causal basis is not to say that one property instantiates another; rather, it is 
to say that an object with that disposition instantiates a property which is 
causally relevant to the manifestation of that disposition. Showing that a 
disposition has a causal basis does not by itself show that it has a distinct 
causal basis. If one object instantiates a dispositional property and a causally 
relevant property, for all that has been said, they might be one and the same 
property. 
If some disposition is relevant to its manifestation, this by itself does not 
rule out some categorical property of the object also being relevant to the 
manifestation. We need not assume that a thing can only have one causal 
basis per disposition; perhaps many of an object's properties are relevant to 
the manifestation of the disposition. Therefore, a disposition could be its own 
causal basis, and have a distinct causal basis as well. 
1.3 Bare Dispositions 
Equipped with this understanding of dispositions and causal bases, we are 
now better placed to understand the concept of a bare disposition. A bare dis 
position is a disposition that has no distinct causal basis, neither disposi 
tional nor categorical. A disposition whose unique causal basis is itself would 
count as a bare disposition. If an object has a bare disposition, the object has 
no intrinsic properties which are both distinct from the disposition and caus 
ally relevant to its manifestation. One might say it is just a brute fact about 
the thing that it is so disposed. For example, suppose a glass were "barely 
fragile," and it shattered. The only properties of the glass which could be 
causally relevant to the shattering are properties which are not distinct from 
fragility. 
In saying that a bare disposition has no distinct causal basis, by 'distinct' 
I cannot mean merely non-identical?for then finding multiple causal bases 
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distinct from the disposition would be too easy, and my thesis would be 
trivially false. If being fragile is causally relevant to breaking, perhaps being 
a fragile glass is as well. If we treat being fragile as distinct from being a 
fragile glass, the glass's fragility could not be a bare disposition, simply 
because being a fragile glass would count as a distinct causal basis. So we 
need to understand 'distinctness' as something other than non-identity. Intui 
tively, we need a notion of two properties being separable or independent. I 
offer as a preliminary suggestion, if "x has property F" entails "x has prop 
erty G," it follows that F and G are not distinct. So, being a fragile glass is 
not distinct from being fragile. 
Before considering the arguments against bare dispositions, I want to clar 
ify what I take bare dispositions to be by way of comparison to other views. 
I think that one cannot show that a disposition is not bare simply by show 
ing that some property is causally relevant to the manifestation of the dispo 
sition. It may be that the disposition itself is causally relevant to the mani 
festation. If a disposition has no causal basis except for itself, it seems right 
to say that the disposition is bare. Hence, I define a bare disposition as a dis 
position that has no distinct causal basis. 
Taking the above points into consideration, I think that my account fares 
better than competing accounts. Mark Johnston offers the following alterna 
tive definition of a bare disposition: If x has a bare disposition, "x would R 
in S under C and no intrinsic feature of x or of anything else is the cause of 
x's R-ing in S."211 take Johnston to be saying that, if x has a bare disposi 
tion, x would exhibit the manifestation in the circumstances of manifesta 
tion, but no intrinsic feature of anything is causally relevant to the manifesta 
tion. It seems as though Johnston is committed to the view that if a barely 
fragile glass was shattered by a hammer, no intrinsic property of the hammer, 
for instance, is causally relevant to the shattering. More to the point, on 
Johnston's account, if bare fragility were an intrinsic property of the glass, it 
could not be causally relevant to the shattering. Johnston's definition signifi 
cantly differs from mine in that it rules out bare dispositions that are both 
intrinsic and causally relevant to their manifestations. 
With my account of bare dispositions in mind, we can now consider the 
question: are such things possible? In the rest of this paper, I will defend the 
claim that they are. One way of showing that bare dispositions are possible 
would be to produce an example. While fragility does not look like a good 
candidate for a bare disposition, perhaps some of the dispositions of funda 
mental particles are. Consider the property of being negatively charged, and 
the dispositions of negatively charged things, such as being disposed to repel 
other negatively charged things. Is there a possible world in which particles 
are negatively charged, but not thereby disposed to repel other negatively 
21 
Mark Johnston, "How to Speak of the Colors," Philosophical Studies 68 (1992): 234. 
THE BARE METAPHYSICAL POSSIBILITY OF BARE DISPOSITIONS 355 
charged particles? If not, then the connection between being negatively 
charged and behaving in certain ways in certain circumstances is not acciden 
tal or contingent. This suggests that negative charge is itself a dispositional 
property (which is not distinct from the disposition to repel negatively 
charged particles). Furthermore, it seems probable that there is no structural, 
micro-physical property of an electron which accounts for its dispositions to 
repel and attract other particles?at any rate, current physics does not tell us 
otherwise. If this is right, then bare dispositions are more than some remote 
metaphysical possibility. Our best scientific theories posit properties which 
are bare dispositions. As Strawson points out: 
It seems that our search for the properties of the categorical base must finally lead us to the 
undeniably theoretical properties which physics assigns to the ultimate constituents of 
matter?perhaps force, mass, impenetrability, electric charge. But these properties seem to be 
22 
thoroughly dispositional in character... 
Blackburn makes the stronger claim that "science finds only dispositional 
properties, all the way down."23 These considerations give us reason to think 
that bare dispositions aren't merely possible, but are instantiated by the ulti 
mate constituents of our actual world. 
2. The Conceptual Argument 
Some say that the very concept of a disposition precludes bare disposi 
tions?that it is part of the concept of a disposition that it has a distinct 
causal basis.24 For example, a disposition can be said to be: 
a higher order property of having some distinct intrinsic properties 
which would cause the manifestation of the disposition in the cir 
cumstances of manifestation.25 
If this definition is correct, bare dispositions are ruled out a priori; it is an 
analytic truth that all dispositions have distinct causal bases. 
However, the causal relations of an object seem far more central to dispo 
sition ascriptions than its intrinsic properties. Consider what we would say if 
we felt justified in making a certain disposition claim but could not find a 
distinct causal basis for that disposition. Suppose an object x reliably exhib 
its manifestation M under circumstances C, but we can find no property dis 
tinct from the disposition that is causally relevant to the manifestation. Per 
22 
"Reply to Evans," 280. 23 
"Filling in Space," 255. 
Gareth Evans, "Things Without the Mind," in Zak van Straaten, ed., Philosophical Sub 
jects (Oxford Clarendon Press), 76-116; also Smith and Stoljar, "Global Response 
Dependence..." 88-90. 5 
Adapted from Johnston, "How to Speak of the Colors," 234. Johnston does not endorse 
this analysis. 
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haps we would assume that there has to be a distinct causal basis, but we just 
haven't discovered it yet. But what would be our grounds for making that 
assumption? Suppose we were in a far superior epistemic situation; we have 
a (nearly) exhaustive list of x's properties and their causal upshots. We are 
trying to decide whether to add disposition D to the list of x's properties. We 
find no other properties that are causally relevant to M, and yet whenever x is 
in C, it exhibits M. What are we to say? If x will exhibit M whenever it is 
in C, it seems natural to say that x is disposed to exhibit M in C, and that it 
has a disposition to exhibit M in C. It would do more injustice to our lin 
guistic practices to deny that the thing has the disposition than to say that it 
does, inexplicable as that may be. 
One might think that the situation I have described is impossible; how 
ever, nothing in our language or our concepts tells us that. We can imagine 
making the discovery described above, so it is no part of the meaning of "dis 
position" or of disposition terms in general that there is a distinct causal 
basis. If the conceptual analysis were correct, we would have to say that the 
object in our example did not have the disposition that we thought it did. 
Even if the foes of bare dispositions were right to say this, though, I don't 
see how they would have achieved any more than a verbal victory. There is a 
substantive issue still left, concerning what types of properties objects can 
have. If what I'm calling "bare dispositions" shouldn't be called "disposi 
tions" strictly speaking, they might nevertheless be possible. 
3. The Non-Identity Thesis26 
In "Three Theses about Dispositions," Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson defend: 
(1) The Causal Thesis: All dispositions have causal bases;27 and 
(2) The Non-Identity Thesis: Causal bases are not identical to their 
attendant dispositions. 
These theses are meant to apply not only to actual dispositions, but to all 
possible dispositions. It follows that, necessarily, every disposition has a 
causal basis which is not identical to the disposition, and so bare dispositions 
Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson (hereafter jointly referred to as 'PPJ') call this thesis "The 
Distinctness Thesis." However, it is clear that by 'distinct', they mean non-identical. As I 
am using the expression 'distinct,' two properties can be non-identical yet fail to be dis 
tinct if one entails the other. To avoid confusion, I translate PPJ's distinctness talk into 
non-identity talk. 
By "causal basis," PPJ mean "the property or property complex of the object that, 
together with ... the antecedent circumstances, is the causally operative sufficient condi 
tion for the manifestation" ("Three Theses...," 251). This is along the lines of my account 
of the causal basis as a property which is causally relevant to the manifestation. Discrep 
ancies between these two accounts, if there are any, should make little difference to the 
discussion that follows, since I grant the Causal Thesis. 
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are impossible.28 I am willing to grant the Causal Thesis for the sake of 
argument. This is no threat to the possibility of bare dispositions. The 
Causal Thesis still leaves open the possibility that the property which is 
causally relevant to the manifestation of a disposition is the disposition 
itself Given that we have no reason to suppose a priori that the causal basis 
is not identical to the disposition, PPJ need to establish the Non-Identity 
Thesis to show that there can be no bare dispositions. 
PPJ offer three main arguments for the Non-Identity Thesis that causal 
bases are not identical to their attendant dispositions: two arguments from 
multiple readability, and one based on what PPJ call "swamping" the causal 
basis. 
3.1 The Arguments from Multiple Realizability 
PPJ begin by noting that a disposition can have different causal bases in dif 
ferent objects. They go on to say: 
We cannot say both that being fragile 
= 
having molecular bonding a, and that being fragile = 
having crystalline structure ?; because by transitivity we would be led to the manifestly false 
29 
conclusion that having molecular bonding a = having crystalline structure p. 
PPJ are assuming that if one is going to identify a disposition with its causal 
basis in one case, one must do so in all cases. They go on to reason that 
since some dispositions can have several distinct causal bases, it is absurd to 
identify the dispositions with each of these causal bases. 
However, if one considers the possibility of bare dispositions, PPJ's 
assumption can be rejected. There is no reason to think that, if one is going 
to identify a disposition with its causal basis, one has to do so in all cases. 
One could identify a disposition with some causal bases, but not others. 
Suppose that a disposition like fragility could be bare in some instances, and 
yet have different causal bases in other instances. In such a case, fragility 
would be identical to the first causal basis, but not the second. We do not 
have to say that if a disposition is ever identical to its causal basis, then it 
has to be identical to all of its possible causal bases. PPJ show at most, that 
in some instances, a disposition is not identical to its causal basis. However, 
this does not preclude the possibility of a disposition being had barely in 
other instances. 
2 
To be more precise, it would follow that there can be no dispositions which have no 
causal bases, nor any dispositions which are identical to their causal bases. However, 
PPJ's arguments leave open the possibility that there can be dispositions which are neither 
identical to, nor distinct from, their causal bases. (I have in mind two different properties 
which are not distinct in the sense I explained earlier, because one entails the other.) 
These dispositions would count as bare dispositions on my view. However, I am inter 
ested in defending the claim that dispositions can be their own causal bases, so I take 
PPJ's challenge seriously. 29 
"Three Theses...," 253. 
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In their second argument, PPJ move from the existential claim that some 
causal bases are not identical to their attendant dispositions to the modal 
claim that no causal basis can be identical to its attendant disposition. Con 
sidering a disposition that has only one causal basis in this world, PPJ claim 
that: 
if 
"fragility (being fragile) = having a (say)" is true, it is necessarily so, and if false, necessar 
ily so (ignoring worlds where one or the other doesn't exist, if there are any). But there are 
worlds where fragile objects do not have a, for it is contingent as to what the causal basis of a 
disposition is. Hence there are worlds where "fragility 
= having a" is false for the decisive 
reason that the extensions of fragility and being a differ in that world; and therefore by rigidity 
it is false in all worlds, including the actual world. 
This argument can be set out as follows. Let D be a disposition, and let P be 
a causal basis of D, leaving it open whether P is identical to D. 
(1) It is contingent that P is the causal basis of D. 
(2) Therefore, there is a world in which there is an object x such that: 
x has D and x does not have P. 
(3) Therefore, there is a world with respect to which 
"having D = having P" is false. 
(4) If "having D = having P" is true, it is necessarily true. 
(5) Therefore, D is not identical to P. 
The bare dispositionalist can grant (1). However, (2) does not follow. What 
follows from (1) is that there are worlds in which an object x has disposition 
D, and P is not a causal basis of D. But that is consistent with x's having P. 
(1) by itself gives us no reason to suppose that there is any world in which 
some object has D but not P?unless of course, we are supposing that P and 
D are different properties, which would beg the question. 
Consider the argument as applied to a particular example. Suppose that 
having negative charge is a dispositional property. Further, suppose that 
negative charge is its own causal basis. Conceding PPJ's points, if "negative 
charge = negative charge" is true, it is necessarily true, and it is contingent 
that the causal basis of negative charge is negative charge. Even if negative 
charge is its own causal basis, it could have had a different causal basis; there 
is a possible world in which objects are negatively charged, say, because of 
some complex structural property. In that world, the structural property is the 
only property which is relevant to the manifestation of negative charge. So 
there is a world in which negative charge is not its own causal basis. How 
30 
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ever, that is not a world in which some object has negative charge, and yet 
does not have negative charge. 
I think that the initial plausibility of PPJ's argument trades on the ambi 
guity of the contested claim: 
"D = D's causal basis" is necessarily true. 
Depending on whether "D's causal basis" is taken to refer rigidly, the 
contested claim can mean: 
(1) Necessarily, D = property P (which happens to be D's causal basis). 
Or it could mean: 
(2) Necessarily, D = any property which fulfills the role of being D's 
causal basis. 
The bare dispositionalist can accept (1) while denying (2), and it is only (2) 
which is subject to the difficulties PPJ raise. I conclude that the arguments 
from multiple readability do not show that a disposition cannot be its own 
causal basis. 
3.2 Swamping the Disposition 
PPJ's third argument for the Non-Identity Thesis runs as follows. Even if 
property P were the only causal basis of some disposition D, a particular 
object x may have P, but x may have other properties that "swamp" P so that 
x does not have D. In that case, x would have P without having D. Therefore, 
P * D. As PPJ put it: 
there is the difficulty that even if there is only one causal basis of fragility, say, bonding a, it 
may happen that although all fragile objects have a, some objects that have a are not fragile. 
This would be the case if there were an internal structural property S which swamped the 
effect of having a. 
First of all, it is not clear why this is not just a case of masking.32 The fra 
gility of a glass is masked when the glass is equipped with internal supports 
that prevent it from breaking. The causal basis is overwhelmed, such that it 
will not produce breaking, even when the glass is struck. However, in the 
case of masking, intuitively, the glass still remains fragile. Therefore, this is 
not a case where you have the causal basis but not the disposition, and so it 
is not a counterexample to the claim that the disposition is identical to the 
causal basis. 
31 
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But perhaps PPJ take themselves to have described a situation in which an 
object has the base property a, but fails to have the disposition, fragility. 
That would be to say, the property a is not a property of the object that, 
together with the circumstances, would be a causally operative sufficient 
condition for breaking. But that is to say that property a is not the causal 
basis of fragility. PPJ define "causal basis" as the property of an object that, 
together with the circumstances, would be the causally operative sufficient 
condition for the manifestation of the disposition.33 So, if an object could 
have some property without having a given disposition, then that property 
cannot be the causal basis of that disposition. In the scenario described above, 
the causal basis of fragility has just been misidentified. 
As applied to a bare disposition, PPJ's suggestion amounts to the claim 
that an object x can have a disposition D, but simultaneously x can have 
some other properties that stop x from having D. I don't know how to make 
sense of this suggestion. Say you have some object x that is "barely fragile." 
You change x's properties by adding some fortifying stuff to it, so that it 
becomes nonfragile. It is not as if, after it has become tough as nails, x has 
the bare fragility lingering inside of it. If the fragility gets "swamped," then 
the disposition and the causal basis go away. If a disposition is its causal 
basis, you're never going to be able to lose the disposition and keep the 
causal basis. 
3.3 Concluding Remarks about The Non-Identity Thesis 
PPJ's arguments don't rule out the possibility of bare dispositions. Perhaps 
this is because PPJ's target is not a bare-dispositionalist, but rather an iden 
tity theorist like Armstrong who argues that two properties which appear 
distinct are in fact one and the same. While PPJ define 'causal basis' without 
appealing to non-dispositional, categorical, or micro-structural properties, 
their arguments for the Non-Identity Thesis assume that we can distinguish in 
some way (descriptively or conceptually, perhaps) between a disposition and 
its causal basis. However, if we are considering a disposition which is its 
own causal basis, we can make no such distinction. A causal basis is simply 
the object's causal contribution to the manifestation. PPJ's arguments for the 
Non-Identity Thesis do not rule out the possibility that what it is about the 
object that causally contributes to the manifestation is just a bare disposi 
tion.34 
33 
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One might think that this possibility is ruled out by the third of the "Three Theses about 
Dispositions," The Impotence Thesis, according to which dispositions are not causally 
relevant. However, the arguments for this third thesis rely on the first two. So, unless we 
have independent reasons for thinking that dispositions are causally irrelevant, PPJ's 
arguments should not convince us that there can be no bare dispositions. 
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4. Bare Counterfactuals 
Disposition claims bear some important relation to counterfactuals. When 
something has a disposition, a certain counterfactual is true of that thing. 
Suppose that I have on my table a normal, water-soluble sugar cube and a 
cup of ordinary tap water, at room temperature. The prevailing circumstances 
(atmospheric pressure, laws of nature, etc.) are as one would expect. Barring 
inductive skepticism, it is safe to say that if I put this sugar cube in this cup 
of water, it would dissolve. In possible worlds talk, in the closest possible 
world in which I put the sugar cube into the water, the sugar cube dissolves. 
The observation that dispositions are connected with counterfactuals in 
this way is supposed to cause trouble for bare dispositions for the following 
reasons. It is reasonable to suppose that true counterfactuals are true because 
of facts about the actual world. Given the circumstances described above, the 
following counterfactual is true: If the sugar cube were placed in water, it 
would dissolve. But given that I haven't actually placed the sugar cube in the 
water, the submersion of the cube and the dissolving of the cube are no part 
of the actual world. What makes the counterfactual true? A plausible answer 
is that it is something about the sugar cube's properties. The sugar cube is 
composed of glucose molecules, connected by weak ionic bonds which break 
when confronted with the bipolarity of H20 molecules, and so on. 
But what if the disposition is bare? If solubility has no distinct causal 
basis, there are no distinct properties of the sugar cube which are causally 
relevant to its dissolving. A bare disposition is like an inexplicable causal 
power. It seems as if the only reason for saying that the object has the bare 
disposition involves non-actual circumstances and events. Is there anything 
about the actual world that makes the counterfactual true? If not, bare disposi 
tions would seem to run afoul of what C. B. Martin, Armstrong, and others 
have called the 'Truth Maker Principle." Armstrong says "It seems obvious 
that for every true contingent proposition there must be something in the 
world (in the largest sense of 'something') which makes the proposition 
true."35 
However, unless more is said about what can and what cannot count as 
something in the world (in the largest sense of 'something') this principle 
seems vacuous. The bare dispositionalist can say that the fact that something 
has a disposition is something in the world. She can say that the counterfac 
tual "if the sugar cube were placed in water, it would dissolve" is made true 
by the sugar cube's being water-soluble. Left at this intuitive and abstract 
level, the argument from Truth Makers does not count against the bare dispo 
sitions thesis. Michael Smith and Daniel Stoljar offer an argument that 
sharpens the point suggested by the Truth Maker Principle. However, this 
Belief, Truth and Knowledge, 11. See also Dispositions: A Debate, 15. 
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argument offers an opportunity for the bare dispositionalist to sharpen her 
reply as well. 
4.1 Smith and Stoljar's Argument 
Smith and Stoljar begin by noting that some disposition claims are contin 
gent; an object with a certain disposition might have lacked it. That is, there 
is a possible world in which that object exists but lacks the disposition. 
Suppose that: 
(1) x is disposed to exhibit manifestation M in circumstances C. 
They give the following semantic analysis of (1): 
(2) "x is disposed to exhibit M in C" is true iff in the closest x-in-C 
world, x exhibits M in C. 
Given the disquotation schema: 
(3) "x is disposed to exhibit M in C" is true iff x is disposed to exhibit 
M in C, 
and from the supposition that (1) is true, they derive: 
(4) In the closest x-in-C world, x exhibits M in C.36 
Smith and Stoljar say that if x's disposition is a bare disposition, then (1) is 
not only contingent, but "barely true." That is to say: 
If (1) is true of the actual world, say, then there is no further facjt about the actual world that 
makes it true. If someone were to ask 'What about the actual world makes (1) true?', the only 37 
thing to say is that x is disposed to verb in C. 
(4) is derived from (1) via the a priori premises (2) and (3). Smith and Stoljar 
claim that this shows that if (1) is contingent and barely true, then (4) must 
be contingent and barely true as well. But what, they ask, does it mean to say 
that (4) is barely true? Consider the worlds @, wb and w2. 
@: x is not in C, and x does not exhibit M. 
w}: x is in C, and x exhibits M. 
w2: x is in C, and x does not exhibit M. 
36 
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According to (4), @ is more similar to w? than it is to w2. But if (4) is barely 
true, there are no intrinsic features of @, Wj, and w2 that make it the case that 
@ is more similar to Wj than it is to w2. What this does, according to Smith 
and Stoljar, is to treat similarity as an extrinsic rather than an intrinsic rela 
tion. There is no intrinsic property of @ in virtue of which it is more similar 
to Wj than it is to w2. If bare dispositionalism were true, the relationship 
between @ and Wj would be one of "bare similarity." Smith and Stoljar deny 
that there is any such external relation of bare similarity. Similarity, they 
claim "is an internal relation par excellence."3* They go on to say: 
We ourselves are not sure that any external relation between possible worlds that the friends 
of the Bare Dispositions Theory succeed in characterizing should count as a relationship of 
39 
similarity. 
The general point can be characterized as follows. If dispositions can be bare, 
then there can be counterfactuals that are barely true. If an object had a bare 
disposition, a certain counterfactual statement would be true, but that state 
ment would not be reducible to or explainable by any categorical facts. If you 
are going to analyze counterfactuals in terms of similarity to other possible 
worlds, then you are going to have to say that similarity between possible 
worlds is not always determined by intrinsic, categorical properties of worlds, 
and that seems like an odd thing to say. 
4.2 The Bare Dispositionalist Response 
There are basically two ways to respond to Smith and Stoljar's argument. 
One is to deny that the bare dispositionalist is committed to the bare truth of 
(4), "In the closest x-in-C world, x exhibits M in C." I gave an account of 
what it means to say a disposition is bare. A bare disposition is a disposition 
with no distinct causal basis. There is no obvious route from there to under 
standing what it means to say that a statement is barely true. As we have 
seen, Smith and Stoljar elaborate on the claim that (1), "x is disposed to 
exhibit M in C," is barely true as follows: 
If ( 1 ) is true of the actual world, say, then there is no further fact about the actual world that 
makes it true. If someone were to ask 'What about the actual world makes (1) true?', the only 
thing to say is that x is disposed to verb in C. 
It is not obvious that that is the only thing to say. The question is ambigu 
ous. It could mean: 
"why should we expect x to manifest the disposition?" 
There might be a number of ways to respond to such a question. Consider the 
"barely" soluble sugar cube. What about the world makes it true that this 
38 
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sugar cube is disposed to dissolve if I put it in this cup of water? Well, for 
one, the sugar cube is not encased in some waterproof coating. For another 
thing, the water is not frozen, but is at 72 degrees. On another reading, the 
question could be asking: "what brought it about that x has this disposition?" 
There might be all manner of things to say about how and why the sugar 
cube acquired its bare disposition. Perhaps God endowed the sugar cube with 
this bare disposition. Or, the question might mean: "in virtue of which under 
lying properties does x have the disposition?" However, if we are supposing 
that x has a bare disposition, this question has a false presupposition. Since 
it is not clear which of these questions is being asked when we say "What 
about the actual world makes (1) true?", it is not clear that if something has a 
bare disposition, any sentence saying so is a sentence which is barely true. 
Moreover, even if we grant that "x is disposed to exhibit M in C" is 
barely true, it does not follow that (4) is barely true as well. Smith and Stol 
jar's semantic analysis of the disposition claim is a conjunction of two sepa 
rable analyses, a counterfactual analysis of dispositions, and a possible worlds 
semantics for counterfactual statements. Smith and Stoljar's argument relies 
upon the a priori truth of the counterfactual analysis of dispositions. That is, 
it relies on (2) '"x is disposed to exhibit M in C is true iff in the closest x 
in-C worlds, x exhibits M in C" being an a priori truth.41 The bare 
dispositionalist is not forced to accept this analysis. There are notorious 
problems for giving a satisfactory counterfactual analysis of dispositions.42 A 
weaker, intuitively plausible claim is that if something has a disposition, 
other things being equal, a certain counterfactual is true of that thing. But 
that is not to say that disposition statements are a priori equivalent to 
counterfactuals. Smith and Stoljar need (2) to be a priori in order for (4) to 
follow a priori from (1). 
Finally, even if we grant that (4) follows a priori from (1), it is not obvi 
ous that (l)'s being barely true entails that (4) is barely true as well. It is not 
clear that bare truth transmits over a priori entailment. To take an example 
from Gareth Evans, if we give the name 'Neptune' to whatever causes the 
perturbations in the orbit of Uranus, then "Neptune is Neptune" a priori 
entails 
"Neptune causes the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus."43 Plausi 
bly, "Neptune is Neptune" is barely true. However, it is not plausible that 
"Neptune causes the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus" is barely true, for 
there are many facts about our solar system and the laws which govern it that 
make the second sentence true. 
41 
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4.3 Biting the Bullet 
We have looked at ways in which the bare dispositionalist could resist having 
to say that (4) is barely true. Now let's look at how the bare dispositionalist 
could respond if she accepts that (4) is barely true. She could admit that 
barely true counterfactuals and extrinsic similarities among possible worlds 
are consequences of allowing bare dispositions into her ontology. More gen 
erally, she would be allowing for irreducible modal properties. By "modal 
properties" I mean things like 'being possible', 'being necessary', 'being a 
cause' and a host of interrelated properties, which includes 'having a disposi 
tion', and 'having a counterfactual true of you'. To say there can be bare dis 
positions is to say that a thing can have a modal property irrespective of its 
other properties. Broadening the picture, that would be to say that a modal 
property of some world does not depend on any other features intrinsic to that 
world. To insist that having a modal property in a world must be based on 
some non-modal properties of that world is to beg the question against the 
bare-dispositionalist. Similarly for Smith and Stoljar's claim that: 
if one possible world is similar to another, this must be explained by the intrinsic features of the 
possible worlds in question.... But to say that similarity must be explained in terms of intrinsic 
features of possible worlds is to insist that it be explained... in terms of the non-dispositional 
44 
properties... 
That is just another way of saying that the modal needs grounding in the non 
modal?the dispositional needs grounding in the non-dispositional. If my 
hypothesis can be put "there can be a modal property that is not grounded in 
non-modal properties," then this has been denied without argument. 
One consideration that Smith and Stoljar raise is that barely true counter 
factuals run afoul of the principle that similarity is an internal relation. I'll 
grant for the sake of argument that modal properties are relational proper 
ties?they depend on which possible worlds are nearby. However, intuitively, 
it is not at all clear why similarity must be similarity of intrinsic properties. 
Two things can be similar in their relational properties. I'm similar to Ned in 
that we are both within a mile of Boston, and that we are both shorter than 
Alex. Do Smith and Stoljar mean to be denying such claims when they say 
that similarity is "an internal relation par excellence"! If people can be simi 
lar with respect to their relational properties, then why not worlds? There 
doesn't seem to be anything wrong in principle with talking about worlds 
being similar to one another with respect to their relations to other worlds. 
For example, some worlds can be similar to one another in that they are more 
similar to the actual world than to some far off world. 
With this in mind, let's reconsider the possible worlds Smith and Stoljar 
described. 
"Global Response Dependence...," 96. 
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@: x is not in C, and x does not exhibit M. 
w,: x is in C, and x exhibits M. 
w2: x is in C, and x does not exhibit M. 
The challenge posed to the bare dispositionalist is to say why @ is more 
similar to w} than it is to w2. Granted, she can't say that they are similar 
with respect to their intrinsic, categorical properties. But she can say that @ 
and Wj are similar in that they are both more similar to other x-Ming-in-C 
worlds than they are to x-not-Ming-in-C worlds. Similarly (or perhaps 
equivalently), she can say that in @ and w1? the counterfactual statement "If x 
were in C, x would exhibit M" is true. She can say that @ and w, are similar 
in that, in both worlds, x has the disposition to exhibit M in C. 
4.4 "Bare Truth" Revisited 
Perhaps Smith and Stoljar's arguments suffer from a less than clear charac 
terization of what it means to say that a statement is barely true. Michael 
Dummett gives an alternative account of bare truth in terms of reducibility: 
"A statement is barely true if it is true, but there is no class of statements not 
containing it or a trivial variant of it to which any class containing it can be 
reduced."45 So, if a statement is barely true, on this view, it can only be 
"reduced" to itself, or a trivial varient. The suggestion is that while ordinary 
disposition statements can be given such a reduction, bare disposition state 
ments cannot. Ordinary (non-bare) disposition statements could be reduced to 
statements about causal bases, or they could be translated into counterfactual 
statements and then cashed out in terms of a less problematic notion, resem 
blance?that is, resemblance among categorical properties of possible 
worlds.46 The reductionist program of translating all statements into state 
ments about categorical or non-modal properties cannot allow for barely true 
modal claims. 
Two questions arise with respect to this conception of bare truth as irre 
ducibility. First, are bare disposition statements irreducible in this sense? 
Plausibly, the answer is yes. Second, is this a problem? Well, it is not clear 
that it is. If bare disposition statements are irreducible, arguably, they are in 
good company. If we are to reduce all statements containing problematic 
"What is a Theory of Meaning II", in Evans and McDowell, Truth and Meaning (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1976), 94. He says that it comes to the same thing as holding "that we 
cannot expect a non-trivial answer to the question 'In virtue of what is a statement ...true 
when it is true?'" (94). Robert Stalnaker points out in Inquiry (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1987) that these do not come to the same thing; you might not be able to reduce a 
statement, and yet there might be some non-trivial answer to the question 'in virtue of 
what is the statement true?' 
This is how Stalnaker characterizes Lewis' view (Inquiry, 155-160). 
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modal notions such as dispositions, causes, and laws, we need some set of 
non-modal facts to reduce them to. Unless we can specify a set of facts that 
will do the job, reductionism is at best a promissory note. As Stalnaker 
points out: 
a reductionist program presupposes that the causal dependencies between events and the 
causal powers of things in a possible world derive from relational properties of the possible 
world, properties defined in terms of the way the possible world resembles other possible 
worlds.... the project requires isolation of a level of pure categorical particular fact relative to 
which possible worlds are compared. 
The familiar form of reduction of macro-properties to microphysical proper 
ties, which is itself a promissory note, would be inadequate to the task of 
reducing all modal notions. This is because, as I suggested earlier, contempo 
rary scientific characterization of the ultimate constituents of matter is rife 
with causal and dispositional notions. If we reject the assumption that we are 
required to give a reductive analysis of modal statements in terms of non 
modal statements, the argument against bare dispositions looks considerably 
weaker. The bullet-biting response to Smith and Stoljar's argument rejects 
this demand outright. 
In sum, it is not clear that the existence of bare dispositions would lead to 
barely true counterfactuals. And furthermore, even if it did, maybe that is 
something a bare dispositionalist could happily live with. 
5. Conclusion 
I have considered several arguments against the possibility of bare disposi 
tions: the Conceptual Argument; Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson's multiple 
readability and swamping arguments for the Non-Identity Thesis; the argu 
ment from the Truth Maker Principle; and Smith and Stoljar's Bare Counter 
factuals argument. I have explained why I think these arguments do not work. 
There are basically two ways of showing that something is possible. One 
is to show that it is actual. I have suggested that fundamental properties such 
as charge are examples of bare dispositions. The plausibility of this claim 
goes towards showing that bare dispositions are possible. Of course, these 
examples are debatable. It is an empirical question whether, for example, the 
disposition to repel negatively charged particles has a distinct causal basis. 
However, if one grants that it is an empirical question, one has granted my 
thesis that bare dispositions are possible. For all we know, electrons may 
have bare dispositions, and even if they don't, they might have. 
Another way of showing that something is possible is by showing that it 
fits into a coherent metaphysical view. We can give a full description of it, 
which, as far as we can tell, entails no contradiction. We can show that the 
47 
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existence of such a thing is not incompatible with other things we believe to 
be true. We can dispel confusions and faulty arguments which may lead one 
to think that such an thing is impossible. My remarks in this paper were 
largely of this type. Of course, I have not shown that no arguments against 
bare dispositions can succeed. However, my arguments have undermined the 
most common reasons for supposing that there are no bare dispositions. 
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